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We present a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol combining a discrete mod-
ulation and reverse reconciliation. This protocol is proven unconditionally secure and allows the
distribution of secret keys over long distances, thanks to a reverse reconciliation scheme efficient at
very low signal-to-noise ratio.
The first practical application of Quantum Information
Theory is certainly quantum key distribution (QKD) [1],
which allows two distant parties to communicate with
absolute privacy, even in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. Two families of QKD protocols coexist today, rely-
ing either on photon counting techniques or homodyne
detection, which correspond to discrete and continuous-
variable protocols, respectively. The better efficiency of
homodyne detection over single photon counting at tele-
com wavelength has stimulated the study of continuous-
variable protocols in the last few years [2, 3]. However,
despite its technological advantages, continuous-variable
QKD (CVQKD) is still not considered as a true alterna-
tive to discrete QKD, mostly because it seems restricted
only to short distances. The main reason for that lies
in the classical post-processing of the data shared by Al-
ice and Bob who need to construct a key from continuous
random values, which is a task far more complicated than
its discrete counterpart.
In this letter, we introduce a specific CVQKD scheme,
which exhibits two specific related advantages : first,
it allows to simplify significantly both the modulation
scheme and the key extraction task, and second, it makes
possible to distill secret keys over much longer distances.
Continuous-variable protocols have recently be shown
to be unconditionally secure, that is, secure against ar-
bitrary attacks [4]. In particular, collective attacks are
asymptotically optimal, meaning that the theoretical se-
cret key rate K obtained using one-way (reverse) recon-
ciliation is bounded below by :
K ≥ I(x : y)− S(y : E) ≡ Kth, (1)
where x, y represent the classical data of Alice and Bob,
and E is Eve's quantum state. Here I(x : y) refers to the
Shannon mutual information [5] between classical ran-
dom values x and y, and S(y : E) is the quantum mutual
information [6] between y and the quantum state E. The
reason for using two different measures of information
is that Eve has no restriction on her capabilities (other
than the ones imposed by quantum mechanics), while
Alice and Bob must be able to extract a key with cur-
rent technology. This secret key rate is valid for reverse
reconciliation [3]: the final key is extracted from Bob's
data and Bob sends some side-information to Alice on
the authenticated classical channel to help her correct
her errors. In addition, one should note that Kth corre-
sponds to a scenario where Alice and Bob could perform
perfect error correction, which is never the case in prac-
tice. For this reason, the key rate must be modified in
the following way [7, 8] :
Kreal = β I(x : y)− S(y : E) (2)
where β is the so-called reconciliation efficiency. The
term β I(x : y) simply corresponds to the amount of
information Alice and Bob have been able to extract
through reconciliation. The second term, S(y : E), is
bounded from the correlation between Alice and Bob's
data, using an Heisenberg-type inequality.
Whereas the reconciliation efficiency is not usually
taken into account to estimate asymptotic bounds, we
must include it in our analysis because it is the currently
limiting factor for the range of CVQKD with Gaussian
modulation. In [8], it was argued that working at low
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR, defined as the ratio of Alice's
modulation variance to the noise variance) increases the
range of the protocol. Unfortunately, maintaining a good
reconciliation efficiency at very low SNR is even more dif-
ficult to achieve. This point is exactly the limitation that
the protocol presented in this paper manages to over-
come, hence allowing QKD over longer distances.
The paper is organized as follows : after detailing the
limitations of the Gaussian modulation, we present our
new four-state protocol as well as its unconditional secu-
rity proof. Then we describe the reconciliation step and
show that its efficiency remains remarkably high, even
at very low SNR. Finally, we show the expected perfor-
mances of the protocol and discuss some perspectives.
Gaussian vs discrete modulation. Most CVQKD pro-
tocols use a Gaussian modulation since it is the one max-
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2imizing the mutual information between Alice and Bob
over a Gaussian channel. In such a protocol, Alice draws
two random values qA, pA with a Gaussian distribution
N (0, VA) and sends a coherent state |qA + ipA〉 to Bob.
The main problem of this modulation arises when one
wants to perform QKD over long distances. In this case,
there are two possibilities to fight the noise induced by
the losses in the channel : either increase the variance of
the modulation so that the SNR remains reasonably high,
or work at low SNR. Unfortunately both approaches tend
to fail over a few tens of kilometers.
Working at high SNR requires to achieve a very good
reconciliation efficiency, otherwise the secret key rate
goes to zero [7, 8]. Capacity-achieving error correcting
codes are therefore required for this task. Unfortunately,
even with the best codes presently available (LDPC codes
[9] or turbo codes [10]), one cannot expect to extend the
range of the protocol well over 30 kilometers [7].
Working at low SNR relieves a little bit the need for
capacity achieving codes, but reasonably good low-rate
codes are still hard to combine with the Gaussian modu-
lation. Some interesting algebraic properties of R8 can be
useful in this situation, and help increasing the achievable
distance to over 50 kilometers [8].
At present time both these approaches seem to have
been pushed at their maximum using the state-of-the-art
channel coding techniques, and breaking this 50 kilome-
ters limit seems unlikely with a Gaussian modulation.
One should now emphasize the following point : if the
optimality of the Gaussian modulation over binary mod-
ulation is clear at high SNR (simply because a binary
modulation does not allow to send more than 1 bit of
information per signal), it is not true any longer for low
SNR. Adding to this fact that a binary modulation allows
for a much better reconciliation efficiency at low SNR,
we infer that the modulation required to achieve long
distances is not Gaussian. Examples of binary (or qua-
ternary depending on the number of quadratures consid-
ered) modulation have been proposed in the past [11, 12]
but often combined with a postselection procedure [13],
and are not known to be unconditionally secure.
The four-state protocol. The protocol we propose runs
as follows. Alice sends randomly one of the four coherent
states : |αei(2k+1)pi/4〉 with k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The am-
plitude α (taken as a real number) is chosen so as to
maximize the secret key rate one can expect from the
expected experimental parameters (transmission of the
line and excess noise). Bob measures randomly one of
the quadratures in the case of the homodyne protocol
[14] and gets the result y. The sign of y encodes the
bit of the raw key while Bob reveals the absolute value
|y| to Alice through the classical authenticated (but not
secure) channel. At this point, Alice and Bob share cor-
related strings of bits. In order to help Alice correct her
data, Bob sends some side-information over the classical
channel, typically the syndrome of his string relative to a
binary code they agreed on beforehand. From a classical
communication perspective, the error correction (recon-
ciliation) is then a problem of channel coding for the so-
called BIAWGN channel, where a binary modulation is
sent over an Additive White Gaussian Noise channel, and
for which there exist very good codes, even for extremely
low SNR.
The present protocol can thus be seen as an hybrid
between the Gaussian modulation protocol, with which
it shares the physical implementation as well as the se-
curity proofs based on the optimality of Gaussian states,
and protocols combining a discrete modulation with post-
selection, for which the error correction is substantially
easier to perform, but whose unconditionnal security has
not yet been established.
Let us now prove that the four-state protocol is uncon-
ditionally secure. First, it is enough to prove the security
against collective attacks as they are the most power-
ful attacks in the asymptotic limit [4]. Then, as usual,
the security is established by considering the equivalent
entanglement-based version of the protocol. The state
sent to Bob in the prepare and measure scheme is a
mixture of four coherent states: ρ = 14
∑3
k=0 |αk〉〈αk|
with αk = α exp(i(2k+ 1)pi/4). The entanglement-based
version uses a purification |Φ〉 of this state such that :
ρ = trA(|Φ〉〈Φ|). This state ρ can be diagonalized as
ρ = λ0|φ0〉〈φ0|+ λ1|φ1〉〈φ1|+ λ2|φ2〉〈φ2|+ λ3|φ3〉〈φ3|
where λ0,2 = 12e
−α2(cosh(α2) ± cos(α2)), λ1,3 =
1
2e
−α2(sinh(α2)± sin(α2)) and
|φk〉 = e
−α2/2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
α4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
(−1)n|4n+ k〉
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Therefore, a particular purifica-
tion of ρ obtained by the Schmidt decomposition is
|Φ〉 = ∑3k=0√λk|φk〉|φk〉 which can be rewritten as
|Φ〉 = 12
∑3
k=0 |ψk〉|αk〉 where the states
|ψk〉 = 12
3∑
m=0
e−i(1+2k)m
pi
4 |φm〉
are orthogonal non-Gaussian states.
The entanglement-based version of the four-state pro-
tocol can be described as follows. The state |Φ〉 is dis-
tributed to Alice and Bob through a channel with trans-
mission T and excess noise ξ. Alice performs the projec-
tive measurement {|ψ0〉〈ψ0|, |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, |ψ3〉〈ψ3|}
on her state, and thus prepares the coherent state |αk〉
when her measurement gives the result k.
In order to prove the security of this protocol, we use
the extremality of Gaussian states to bound the Holevo
information between Eve and Bob's classical variable [15,
16]. This Holevo information can be computed from the
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Figure 1: (Color online) Left : correlation ZEPR of an EPR
pair (full line) and correlation Z of state |Φ〉 (dashed line) as
a function of the modulation variance. Right : reconciliation
efficiency for a binary modulation (dashed line) and for a
Gaussian modulation (full line) [17].
covariance matrix Γ of the state shared by Alice and Bob :
Γ =
(
(VA + 1)1 2
√
TZσz√
TZσz (TVA + 1 + ξ)1 2
)
where VA is the variance of Alice's modulation in the
prepare and measure scheme and T and ξ refer to the
experimentally estimated transmission and excess noise
of the channel. This covariance matrix has the same form
as in the Gaussian modulation scheme where Z would be
replaced by ZEPR =
√
V 2A + 2VA, the correlation of an
EPR pair. The correlation Z for the state |Φ〉 does not
take such a simple mathematical form but turns out to
be almost equal to ZEPR for small variances (see Fig. 1).
This means that if Alice uses a modulation with small
variance, then all the information shared between Alice,
Bob and Eve will essentially be the same as in the Gaus-
sian modulation case, so the secret rate will also be the
same [7]. Combining this with an efficient reconciliation
at low SNR (see Fig. 1) allows to distill a key in conditions
where the Gaussian modulation protocol is ineffective.
Realistic reconciliation. The main advantage of a bi-
nary modulation compared to a Gaussian modulation is
that one can find binary codes allowing high reconcilia-
tion efficiency, e.g. 80%, even with a SNR close to 0. This
is quite remarkable since the reconciliation efficiency for
a Gaussian modulation dramatically drops to zero as the
SNR becomes too low (see Fig. 1). In order to achieve
an efficient reconciliation at low SNR, one needs good
low-rate codes. These can be constructed rather easily
with a concatenation of a capacity-achieving code and a
repetition code that we describe now.
At the end of the quantum exchange, Alice and Bob
share two correlated vectors x = (x1, · · · , xN ) (with
xi = ±α/
√
2) and y = (y1, · · · , yN ). We will use the
concatenation of a capacity-achieving code C of lengthm
and a repetition code of length k, assuming thatN = mk.
Bob starts by defining the vector Y = (Y1, · · · , Ym) where
Yi = sign(yk(i−1)+1) for i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. The goal of the
reconciliation is for Alice to be able to compute the vector
Y . To do this, Bob sends some side-information : the vec-
tor {|y1|, · · · , |yN |}, the m vectors {(1, sign(yk(i−1)+1 ×
yk(i−1)+2), · · · , sign(yk(i−1)+1 × yki)}, and the syndrome
of Y˜ for the code C. This scheme allows Alice and Bob
to extract m bits out of their N = km data.
This repetition scheme is a simple way to build a good
code of rate R/k out of a code of rate R. This construc-
tion is not optimal compared to using a very good error
correcting code at the considered signal-to-noise ratio but
exhibits some interesting features. First, designing very
good codes at low SNR is not easy, and has not been
intensively studied so far, mainly because the telecom
industry does not operate in this regime : this would not
be economical since an important number of physical sig-
nals would be required to send one information bit. The
problem is very different in QKD, where quantum noise
is an advantage rather than a drawback. A second ad-
vantage of this repetition scheme lies in its simplicity. As
we mentionned earlier, the main bottleneck of CVQKD
is the reconciliation : it was limiting both the range and
the rate of the protocol. In particular, the rate is lim-
ited by the complexity of decoding LDPC codes, which
is roughly proportional to the size of the code considered
(in fact O(N logN)). If one uses a repetition scheme of
parameter k, then the length of the LDPC code becomes
m = N/k allowing a speedup of a factor k. The speed
of the reconciliation is not proportional to the number
of signals exchanged by Alice and Bob anymore, but to
the mutual information they share, which is a major im-
provement for noisy channels, i.e., long distance. Finally,
the penalty in terms of reconciliation efficiency imposed
by using this scheme instead of a dedicated low rate error
correcting code is actually quite small. Roughly speak-
ing, a repetition code of length k allows to decode at
a SNR k times smaller. It is indeed easy to show that
the efficiency βR(s/k) obtained at a SNR s/k with such a
repetition code is related to the efficiency βLDPC(s) avail-
able at SNR s through βR(s/k) =
log2(1+s)
k log2(1+s/k)
βLDPC(s),
that is, βR(s/k) ≈ (1 − s2 )βLDPC(s) when s is small
enough. For instance, there exist good LDPC codes
of rate 1/10 decoding at SNR 0.17 [18], meaning that
βLDPC(0.17) ≈ 88% and ∀k ≥ 1, βR( 0.17k ) ≥ 80%. By
using different codes, one can have a reconciliation effi-
ciency greater than 80% for all SNR below 1.
The reconciliation scheme presented above performs
indeed much better at low SNR (lower that 1) than rec-
onciliation schemes used for a Gaussian modulation. This
behaviour is inverted for higher SNR as a binary mod-
ulation is unable to send more that one bit per channel
use. As a consequence, the four-state protocol is partic-
ularly relevant in a long distance scenario, whereas the
Gaussian modulation protocol is still better suited to dis-
tribute high key rate at short distances.
Results and perspectives. The theoretical performances
of the four-state protocol are displayed on Fig. 2. The
quantum channel is characterized by its transmission
T = η 10−0.02d where η is the quantum efficiency of the
homodyne detection and d is the distance between Al-
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Figure 2: (Color online) Secret key rate as a function of the
distance for different values of the excess noise: from top to
bottom, ξ = 0.002, 0.004, 0.006, 0.008, 0.01. The quantum ef-
ficiency of Bob's detection is η = 0.6.
ice and Bob, and its excess noise ξ, that is the noise in
excess compared to the shot noise. It should be noted
that these performances are comparable with discrete-
variable protocols, and are much better than previous
CVQKD schemes.
Whereas Alice usually sends coherent states with a few
photons per pulse (between 3 and 10) in the Gaussian
modulation protocol, here, the optimal number of pho-
tons per pulse typically ranges from 0.2 to 1. There-
fore, the similitudes with discrete-variable QKD are im-
portant : the information is encoded onto low ampli-
tude coherent states with generally less than 1 photon
per pulse. The main difference is that an homodyne de-
tection replaces photon counting. In our protocol, how-
ever, the error rate is not upper bounded (and can be as
close as 0.5 as the reconciliation efficiency allows). This
sounds in disagreement with security proofs for discrete-
variable protocols that impose a maximum admissible
quantum bit error rate (QBER). The reason for which
this is nonetheless correct is that the error rate in our
case in induced by both the noise added by Eve as well
as the losses. This is in fact equivalent to a BB84 proto-
col where Bob would give a random value to each pulse
he did not detect. In this case, the QBER is arbitrar-
ily high, but the security is still insured. In some sense,
the main difference between the two schemes is that the
vacuum noise is processed in two very different ways :
whereas it creates deletion errors (which are ignored)
in the photon counting scheme, it produces real errors
(which have to be corrected) in the continuous-variable
scheme. But in both cases, these errors due to vacuum
noise cannot be exploited by anybody, neither Alice or
Bob, nor Eve.
As a conclusion, we presented a new unconditionally
secure continuous-variable QKD protocol based on a dis-
crete modulation. The use of good error correcting codes
at low SNR allows to achieve long distances, which was
impossible with a Gaussian modulation. Further work
will include analysis of the finite-key effects [19], as well
as the implementation of the present protocol.
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